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Maritime Interdiction Operations in support of the Counterterrorism War

by

Alexander E. Carr
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

4 February, 2002

Faculty Advisor
Professor David F. Chandler
JMO Faculty

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This paper proposes Maritime Interdiction Operations as an offensive operation in the war against terrorism. First, this paper will focus on the background of Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) and how to use naval power and sea control to attack terrorists. It will show how MIO can provide a low impact method for gaining access and cooperation from sovereign states where other military methods are restricted. Next, this paper will discuss the operational factors time, space and force and how they apply to MIO in the war against terrorism. Next, the paper will address several of the major challenges and requirements confronting the commander employing MIO in these operations; as among them - the interagency requirements, theater intelligence, command and control, and legal considerations. Potential counter-arguments to this operational concept will then be considered. Finally, this paper will provide specific recommendations for using MIO to fight terrorism. The ultimate objective is to show the reader how MIO, a sea control operational concept, will strengthen the counterterrorism campaign.

The Strategic Objective

The Strategic Objective of the campaign against terrorism is to defeat terrorists with global reach¹. President Bush has identified the military as essential to this effort:

"The ability of the United States to protect the United States and its citizens, and to help its allies and other cooperating nations protect their nations and their citizens, from such further terrorist attacks depends in significant part upon using the United States Armed Forces to identify terrorists and those who support them, to disrupt their activities, and to eliminate their ability to conduct or support such attacks."²

Operation *Enduring Freedom* in Afghanistan was the first salvo in this campaign. Operation *Noble Eagle* is the concurrent homeland defense operation. Both of these operations have incorporated MIO. In *Enduring Freedom*, coalition ships in the Indian Ocean are attempting

to prevent the escape of al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. At home, the Coast Guard is positioning to prevent a seaborne terrorist threat. In both cases, the use of MIO is essentially *ad hoc*, and supportive of a larger operation. Neither MIO meets the goal of disrupting or eliminating a terror operation. Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, defines counterterrorism as "offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism."³ This paper will argue for a paradigm shift in the use of MIO. Maritime Interdiction Operations should be used as an offensive operation.

Future operations within this campaign will not be as clearly defined as in Afghanistan. What is clear is that the counterterrorism campaign will not end with our success in Afghanistan nor with the capture of Usama Bin Laden. Where to go next? The first priority is the worldwide network of al-Qaeda.

A number of countries have been identified by US officials as harboring al-Qaeda groups or other organizations linked in some way with Usama Bin Laden. Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, Indonesia and the Philippines have all been mentioned.⁴

Operations need to be taken against al-Qaeda and associated terror groups. One region in particular, Southeast Asia, is rife with terror groups. The Department of State has identified twenty-seven global terror groups. Number two on this list is the Abu Sayyaf Group.⁵ This group is responsible for the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 and in an attempt to destroy six airliners in-flight. Abu Sayyaf has connections to al-Qaeda and numerous terror organizations in Southeast Asia. This region will be used to illustrate of how naval force, MIO in particular, can be applied to disrupt and eliminate terrorists.

MIO Background

What role has MIO played in the past and what is the current role of MIO? Joint Pub 3-07 defines MIO as "operations which employ coercive measures to interdict the movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area."⁶ MIO is

primarily a sanctions enforcement tool, as it is today in the Persian Gulf. It, however, has also been used for various other objectives. These include arms embargoes (Adriatic, 1993), human interception (Haiti, 1993-94), and currently for counter-drug operations in the Caribbean. MIO has not been used for counterterrorism.

It is appropriate here to distinguish between two definitions for the acronym MIO. The common definition is Maritime Interception Operations. Recently, warfare publications^A have been using Interdiction for the "I" in MIO. Regardless, the conceptual use has meant exactly the same tactic. For the purposes of this paper, Interdiction will stand for the "I" in MIO. Interdiction has an emphatically offensive sense. Merriam-Webster defines interdiction as "to destroy, damage, or cut off by firepower to stop or hamper an enemy."⁷ Joint Pub 1-02 defines interdiction as "an act to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's surface potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces."⁸ In these terms Interdiction fits better in the offensive context of counterterrorism.

How Can MIO attack terrorists?

The campaign against terrorism calls for a comprehensive military approach that will disrupt or destroy the enemy. We must not allow terrorists freedom to use the sea. We also must use a method that does not destabilize friendly governments or regions. MIO will provide the Combatant Commander (CINC) with the means to achieve this goal.

In this campaign, we must account for all facets of terrorist activity and communication, including their access and use of the sea. Terrorist bases are being identified and destroyed by the United States and other countries (Yemen, Somalia, and the Philippines). Land and air methods of communication are being targeted by friendly forces

^A For example, EXTAC 1012, *Maritime Interdiction Force Procedures* and Naval Warfare Pub 3-07.4, *Maritime Counter Drug and Alien Migrant Interdiction Operations*.

or screened by anti-terrorism^B security measures. Nevertheless, sea lines of communication largely remain unchallenged.^C A quick glance at the known locations of al-Qaeda shows a common thread. These cells operate in countries, except for Afghanistan, that have sea frontiers. (It can be argued that the porous condition of the Pakistani borders gave al-Qaeda sea access even in Afghanistan.) The al-Qaeda group has access to ships and freighters operated by its business fronts.⁹ This capability should be denied by preemptively establishing sea control in high threat regions.

MIO is the sea control method of choice for the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard and can be applied to the war on terrorism. Numerous sanctions enforcement missions have given the United States ample practice in MIO. MIO is also the preferred method for interdicting non-state entities such as terrorists. Other methods of sea control such as blockades and quarantines are means to attack a state. These are acts of war, or closely akin to war, and cannot be used against friendly or neutral states in this campaign. MIO is the modern day offensive blockade. In Mahan's terms its purpose is "to prevent the entrance of needed supplies, and being therefore a blow against communications."¹⁰ In the islands and waters of the Southern Philippines, Abu Sayyaf sustains itself by drug smuggling, piracy and maritime kidnapping. Disruption of this group should be performed by MIO. This would achieve the strategic objective in the war against terrorism.

Operational planners should consider MIO as a supported counterterrorism operation. In the case of *Enduring Freedom* or *Desert Storm*, it clearly is/was a supporting operation. This paper does not deny the importance of MIO in the support role. It is, however, a

^B Anti-terrorism is defined by Joint Pub 3-07 as defensive in nature.

^C This is especially true outside of the Central Command (CENTCOM) AOR.

credible method in situations where conventional power projection operations would be detrimental or impossible.

MIO is a politically viable operational concept for this war. Our military actions must avoid destabilizing friendly governments. The modern dispersed terrorist resides in countries (or regions) that are often not considered sponsors of terrorism. It will be much more difficult for the United States to use air strikes or gain access for large land forces in these sovereign states. This is particularly true in Southeast Asia. The governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines are likely to be unwilling to allow large scale American intervention. These countries certainly are not stable domestically. Additionally, they have large Islamic populations. The political situation in Pacific Command (PACCOM) requires a operational concept which is effective against the enemy but not overtly threatening to heavily Islamic (and al-Qaeda sympathetic) populations. This has been one of the downfalls of retaliatory actions against terrorism.

"Terrorism has a dynamic similar to that of guerrilla warfare, in which one of the purposes of the guerrilla's attacks is to goad the government into counterattacking in ways that will alienate the civilian population and increase recruits, resources, and sympathy for guerrillas."¹¹

The Islamic sympathies in Pakistan almost prevented U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Such resistance is likely to materialize in Indonesia or the Southern Philippines. Naval forces are able to support friendly governments more discreetly than a large occupying land force. This is due to the Navy's constant forward presence, which makes their appearance a commonality. This *Routine Presence*, "promotes national influence and access to critical global areas, builds regional coalitions and collective security, furthers stability, deters aggression, and provides initial crisis-response capability."¹² MIO is less intrusive because it

is performed at sea, usually over the horizon. This concept is an effective tool for the commander who must operate in a politically inhospitable environment.

Operational Factors of MIO in support of counterterrorism

The CINC will be balancing space, time, and force factors by using MIO for counterterrorism. U.S. naval^D forces would dominate the operational space and would have an overwhelming force advantage. The operational planner must beware that it is possible in a poorly designed operation for the terrorist organization to enjoy an advantage in time.

In terms of the operational space, U.S. naval forces can establish sea control quickly in the counterterrorism campaign. No terrorist organization is able to compete with the U.S. Navy for dominance of the sea space. This is especially true in the littoral battlespace where terrorists commonly use the sea to operate.

"Exercising command of the sea requires that a fleet be capable of carrying out simultaneously or sequentially a number of strategic and operational tasks. Because of the generally small area and shorter distances involved, a blue-water navy can exercise command of a typical narrow sea by deploying a fraction of its forces"¹³

In Pacific Command, MIO should be undertaken between the Southern Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. In these archipelagic waters, the overwhelming numbers and capabilities of U.S. naval forces should ensure success. Additionally, the U.S. enjoys an advantage in basing options. Singapore, Japan, and the Philippines are all bases from which naval forces can operate safely and effectively.

In terms of the operational forces, the CINC will enjoy a superior force. U.S. naval forces dominate in equipment, manpower, training and tactics. The CINC, however, will need to compete for resources to use MIO. These forces may be performing deterrence, wartime or anti-terrorism duties. This includes Coast Guard patrols at home in support of

^D U.S. Naval forces include the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard

Operation *Noble Eagle*. The United States may avoid resource issues by enlisting the participation of coalition partners. As PACCOM's Admiral Blair stated, "There are no Afghanistans in our part of the world, there are countries who want to go against international terrorism but not all of them have the capability."¹⁴ The United States will take the lead in MIO operations and eventually turn leadership over to a multinational team, possibly administered by the United Nations (UN). In the Persian Gulf and Adriatic operations, supportive countries were often unable to provide significant air or land forces but were able to augment multi-national MIO operations. The U.S. Navy is able to perform MIO independently. It should, however, capitalize on global support for eliminating terror threats by requesting coalition partners.

In PACCOM, there is a clear opportunity to build a MIO-centric coalition. The United States must enlist the support from those countries most affected by low intensity crime/terrorism. There is a commonly recognized link between crime (drug smuggling, kidnappings, and piracy) and the financing of terror groups. "The Abu Sayyaf Islamic terrorist group and the Moro National Liberation Front's "Lost commandos" have engaged in maritime attacks to raise funds to carry out attacks against the government."¹⁵ To combat terrorism, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines are making unprecedented strides in cooperating to address these issues.¹⁶ Operational planners should consider three criteria for developing for multi-national naval operations. "The first is to cooperate with those countries who share fundamental values. . . . A second criterion is to cooperate with neighboring navies in geographic proximity of one another. . . . The third criterion is to cooperate with similar national interests."¹⁷ We should use this cooperation as a springboard to launching a United States led MIO.

The factor of time is a potential limitation on this concept. The CINC must recognize that a successful MIO relies on the terror group using of the sea. Terrorists groups will bunker down and avoid re-supply, maneuver, and escape by sea. Planners must account for this possibility. It is unlikely that a terror group will give up lucrative smuggling (drugs or arms) or cease piracy or kidnapping for extended periods. Nor are CINCs going to sit on the sidelines and wait for the next attack. With coordinated operations, joint or coalition forces will "force" terrorist into the MIO web. American dominance in information and intelligence will be key in overcoming the problem of the terrorist hiding for time.

Counterterrorism specific MIO Challenges/Requirements

MIO used for counterterrorism will require supporting measures to make it successful. Although a naval operation, MIO cannot effectively operate without joint forces. There must be supporting land, air, and Special Forces actions. Interagency coordination and participation is also required. These combined instruments of national power should be used to ensure the success of the MIO.

Operation *Enduring Freedom* has shown the value of supporting elements of military power combating terrorism. Special forces and air power were the supported operations, maritime and land force elements are largely playing supporting roles. This is especially true for the MIO attempting to shut off the Taliban and al-Qaeda escape. A mix of land, air, and Special Forces must support offensive MIO.

The CINC must tailor his land and air forces to minimize their negative impact while optimizing effects to make the MIO successful. The CINC may not be able to deploy large air and land forces due to the political risk of destabilizing friendly governments. PACCOM

is already undertaking measures that support this concept. "We are providing military assistance and support to the Philippines in order to take this group out."¹⁸ In this case, PACCOM is providing Special Forces to train and advise Philippine forces in combating Abu Sayyaf. These actions are a perfect support for a MIO.

Interagency Operations

MIO, as a non-traditional offensive operation, would more than ever require interagency coordination. This paper argues for MIO as the centerpiece military operation. In some cases, however, MIO may be the main military action in conjunction with/or supporting interagency operations. "Extrapolating the concept of "jointness" beyond the military realm, other elements of national power should be integrated into the modern blockade [or MIO] to achieve synergistic effects by combining diplomatic, economic, military, and informational actions."¹⁹

Interagency coordination with the military is critical to establish the conditions necessary for a successful MIO. The Department of State (DOS) has the lead for counterterrorism outside the United States. Using the "country team" framework, the DOS should establish the diplomatic environment to operate an effective MIO. Specifically, DOS needs to convince sovereign states that U.S. naval forces should operate in their home seas. The "country team" also provides critical support in international military training and security assistance activities. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is a proven service in counterterrorism. This has been made especially overt by recent accomplishments in *Enduring Freedom*. CIA stations in the target countries (either inside or outside the "country team") need to facilitate the MIO by establishing networks and providing information. The CINC's CIA liaison officer is critical in ensuring that CIA and military operations are

complementary. Due to the law enforcement aspects of counterterrorism and MIO, support from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is needed. FBI actions will also supplement the intelligence capabilities of the force. The operational planner must note that this offensive MIO concept absolutely requires interagency support for success.^E As naval theorist Julian Corbett said, "To be effective, a well organized and highly trained navy must be complemented by a well organized and highly trained diplomatic and military establishment."²⁰

Operational Intelligence

Intelligence operations are essential prior to using MIO to combat terrorism. Human intelligence gathering will be the primary method for targeting unconventional and relatively unsophisticated terror groups. Military intelligence gathering, by both national-asset sensors and conventional airborne and surface systems, will enhance human intelligence. Foreign intelligence gathering will be augmented by our liaison with coalition countries. This will be particularly true in the countries where terrorists operate. "The dependence on foreign liaison is even greater when the task is not just to collect information on international terrorism but to take action to counter it."²¹ Finally, we will rely on both Special Forces and the intelligence agencies to refine targeting for MIO.

What information is needed for MIO to be effective? First, the area of operation must be defined. This will allow planners to choose the appropriate sized force and bases of operation. Second, intelligence must provide the type and numbers of enemy vessels to interdict. This is crucial for tailoring the appropriate resources for the specific MIO. For example, a particular MIO may require a riverine capability. Third, intelligence must provide credible information on when to interdict. This is important so as not to disrupt

^E Detailed information on planning interagency operations is found in Joint Pub 3-08.

prematurely and endanger overall operational success. It is also unreasonable in terms of resources and other national security commitments to run large scale MIO for long periods. These are some of the more important areas of information critical to the operational planner. In the planning process, it is beneficial to use lessons learned from drug interdiction. As Admiral Blair stated, "There are a lot of similarities between taking down druggies and taking down international terrorists."²²

Operational Command and Control

This MIO concept will require cooperation with sovereign states and building coalitions. It will not be coalition building for legitimacy alone. The fact is that terror groups operate within friendly states. The United States must consider how it will organize its multi-national command relationships.

We will certainly provide the preponderance of naval forces for this MIO concept. The overall leadership of the operations should remain with the United States. As the operation matures, the commander may see reason to delegate to coalition partners that are proficient in naval tactics, especially MIO. To balance burden sharing and alleviate national concerns, supporting land forces should be commanded by the "target" state. The *Enduring Freedom* model should work well. U.S. forces will advise and provide communication connectivity to coalition MIO forces. Operational planners may find utility in using parallel command structures to incorporate coalition partners. This will maximize multi-national considerations identified in Joint Pub 3: National Goals, Unity of effort; Doctrine, Training, and Equipment; Cultural differences, Management of Resources, and National Communications.²³

Law Considerations

While this paper is not meant to be a legal treatise, the basic question should be asked. Is MIO used for counterterrorism legal? There are many ways for skilled diplomats and military lawyers to rationalize and legalize MIO. Given the current Law of the Sea and UN conventions, MIO is a legitimate response to combat terrorism. Legality will not be a substantive issue until we are denied access to territorial waters. In this case the United States will be treading on new legal ground.

To combat terror groups by using MIO, the precedent and laws regarding visit and search will apply. In international waters, the United States should have relatively free hand in enforcement. The correlation between terror groups and drugs should allow the operational planner to use counter drug rules in certain situations. The same should apply for piracy and maritime kidnapping. From the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, "All States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State."²⁴

Access to territorial waters and boarding flagged vessels will be significant hurdle in using MIO for counterterrorism. Building coalitions with states in whose waters we operate will alleviate most problems. It is imperative that the DOS works to establish a permissive environment for MIO to operate. It may be that the only cooperation a state provides is the right of pursuit or seizure in their territorial sea. What must be avoided is a situation, as is in place in the Persian Gulf, where smugglers seek sanctuary in a third party's territorial waters (Iran). Some countries that have no or little capacity to fight may request U.S. assistance through the collective security arrangements under the UN charter. This method allowed U.S. vessels to patrol Kuwaiti seas in *Desert Shield*.

In the case of an uncooperative or belligerent state, the United States will have to investigate new approaches to legalize MIO. National self-defense may apply under the UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 51. In this circumstance, the United States or our allies may declare MIO a necessary measure under individual or collective self-defense. In these situations we must weigh the potential benefits with the risks of escalation.

Counter Arguments

Some may argue that MIO to fight terror is an ineffective use of limited assets. They will cite the resource and manpower intensive MIO operation in the Persian Gulf as a prime example. While this MIO has been long and drawn out, it has been successful. Persian Gulf MIO occupies most surface combatants once they arrive in the CENTCOM area of operations. It also has seen a gradual diminishment in the rate of return as Gulf States continue to chip away at its effectiveness. These operations have contributed to high personnel operational tempo and it remains a dangerous job, as seen recently with a death of a MIO sailor. Much of the criticism, from pundits and by military rank and file, of Persian Gulf MIO is due to the lack of political success in the sanctions campaign. Persian Gulf MIO has achieved its purpose, however, as Iraq has been unable to sell sufficient oil to undertake massive rearmament.

The case for MIO used offensively for counterterrorism is much stronger. There cannot be a more compelling reason to attempt this concept than national self-defense and preservation of the American way of life. Even if no terrorist is caught, the likelihood of disrupting their financial lifeblood, intercepting arms, and discouraging movement will achieve a tangible benefit. Beyond this, the benefit of furthering the CINC's theater engagement process will pay huge dividends. "Now that we are on the offensive, Abu

Sayyaf is on the run . . . one measure of success is that we can assure ourselves that the capability of these groups that can do harm to the U.S. is eliminated or drastically reduced."²⁵

In this new world order, measuring the effect of operations against terrorists will be extremely difficult. The best measure will be that no terrorist act is allowed to happen.

Coalition Technological Issues

The technological immaturity of coalition partners will be a problem in using MIO for counterterrorism. Political and military leaders do not like giving any measure of operational control or the chance of success to foreigners. One potential issue with MIO is our desire to fight predominantly with technology. *Enduring Freedom* and its recent predecessors were technologically advanced and tightly controlled wars. The operations with Afghan tribes even managed to take on a flavor of global management. Special operations troops called in strikes to orbiting B-52s on behalf of the Northern Alliance. Operational commanders were able to apply a high level of control to even these conditions. This may not be true with MIO.

Technology will play its role, but this operational concept will require age-old navy tactics. We may not need to rely on coalition partners for military means, but we will require their participation to gain access. Most countries like the Philippines, Indonesia, or Malaysia do not enjoy our technological prowess. We will need to exercise patience, due diligence, and establish strong liaison relationships to make it work.

In his book, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Paul Pillar argues strongly that the military instrument often is misused in the counterterrorism role. He bases his observation on the standard pattern of counterterrorism action and their results. He cites actions such as *El Dorado Canyon* (Libya, 1986), *Desert Fox* (Iraq, 1993) and cruise missile attacks on al-

Qaeda (Afghanistan, Sudan 1998) as prime examples. The potential pitfalls he listed are: (1) the action is usually unilateral (except maybe for Britain) (2) terrorists are hard to target (3) it is difficult to get appropriate weapons on target (4) the action needs a high standard of proof for the world community and, (5) the United States is perceived as a bully.²⁶

Using MIO alleviates many of these issues. MIO is far less violent than power projection strikes. MIO will minimize casualties, thus the "bully" perception is minimized. As stated earlier, MIO will not be unilateral. MIO will also have the tangential effects of reducing maritime crime and increasing regional security. Pillar's arguments for a complementary package of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of power are valid. However, his perception that airstrikes are the only likely military counterterrorism response is far from accurate.

Operational Recommendations

There is no specific doctrine for using MIO against the terror threat. MIO, in its sanctions enforcement role, is listed as a flexible deterrent option in many Joint Publications. This paper has argued for the expanded use of MIO beyond a deterrence role and to adopt it as offensive tool.

MIO should continue to be a flexible deterrent option to shape the operational environment. Operational planners, however, should consider MIO as a powerful operational tool if deterrence should fail. It is part of U.S. policy to supply aid to "bolster the counterterrorism capabilities of those countries that work with the U.S. and require assistance." ²⁷ MIO with local nations will reduce our resource commitment while still improving regional stability. The United States can provide the necessary training and resources until local nations can manage running the operation on their own. Regional

security should be bolstered as regional or international groups, like Association of South East Asian Nations or the U.N., eventually take over and conduct the preponderance of MIO.

Some methods for achieving this goal are:

A. Institute MIO counterterrorism training with foreign navies, and continue current U.S. Navy liaison programs. Exploit all opportunities to bring friendly nations into the counterterrorism effort.

B. Increase the use of the Coast Guard as subject matter experts for multi-national training. The Coast Guard already trains foreign countries using their Law Enforcement and Tactical Detachments teams, leverage these to support this counterterrorism MIO concept.

C. Provide Security Assistance funds to friendly nations, especially to "target" states where we require territorial access to combat terrorism. We should bolster their ability to undertake MIO, and enhance their ability to operate with U.S. naval forces.

D. Coordinate interagency operations and assets to support MIO in the counterterrorism effort, especially where none have existed previously. Specifically, providing intelligence or helping naval forces build liaisons with local military or "others".

E. Plan multi-national operations/exercises around MIO. Use joint and combined tactical supporting actions to "flush" terrorist groups into a MIO trap. Use joint and combined intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to help MIO targeting.

The United States should exploit our numerical, technological, and tactical expertise in using MIO offensively. There are numerous tactical publications on performing MIO.

Augmenting our expertise are some concepts that can be applied to MIO:

A. Establish a "Fly away" MIO or Standing MIO Joint Task Force^F. This could be used with U.S. Forces in region that are unfamiliar with the concept and tactics. It also can be used in a purely advisory role to foreign navies.

B. Augment the conventional surface force with U.S. Special Boat Units and a resurrection of the true Marine Corps/Navy team. Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) have a doctrinal capability in MIO. These capabilities should not be overlooked.

C. Consider the Coast Guard's operation in the counter-drug war as a model for MIO in the war against terrorism. The Coast Guard uses multi-layered interdiction operations with

^F This "Fly away" MIO Joint Task Force concept could be modeled after the "Fly Away" Joint Force Air Component Commander. The standing Joint Task Force concept could be modeled after the Counter Drug Joint Task Forces East/West, but the MIO Joint Task Force would be a deploying force.

MIO as the centerpiece. After success has been achieved, the force will periodically "surge" to achieve its goal. Coalition forces, with U.S. naval forces providing "surge" capabilities, could run the day-to-day operation of MIO. In PACCOM this could be easily done with transiting Maritime Action/ Surface Action groups or carrier battle groups.

Conclusion

The counterterrorism war will be long and violent. Attacking or protecting against the overt threat should always be a priority. However, with global terror groups, their operations are difficult to target. Opportunities for conventional operations against terrorism will be rare. The CINCs must use whatever tool they have to bring force to bear.

MIO is an especially useful tool in its current form of sanctions enforcement. Like sanctions enforcement, the use of counterterrorism MIO will capitalize on the widespread access afforded by the sea. Terrorists use the sea for communication (maneuver and movement), financial gain (piracy), and for escape. The United States and its partners in the fight against terror should look to shut off all these avenues for terrorists. MIO can be the centerpiece for coalition efforts. Challenges posed by law and command and control can be overcome. It will be necessary to support MIO with land and air efforts. In many regions, however, MIO will be the only politically viable option.

Lastly, the challenge will be to convince political and military leaders to try a new operational concept. Political leaders must accept foreign cooperation. A wary naval service needs to be persuaded to use limited assets in the MIO role. The support of intelligence services and agencies will be critical for operational success. A coordinated offensive Maritime Interdiction Operation can be a key tool to disrupt and eliminate terrorist operations.

Notes

¹ George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People", White House, September 20 2001, <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>> [2 February 2002]

² George W. Bush, "President Issues Military Order", White House, 13 November, 2001, <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-27.html>> [2 February 2002]

³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Joint Publication 3-07 (Washington, DC: 16 June 1995), III-3.

⁴ Jonathan Marcus, "Analysis: The War Ahead", BBC News, 17 December 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/world/south_asia/newsid_1715000/1715473.stm> [2 February 2002]

⁵ Department of State, "Comprehensive List of Terrorists and Groups Identified Under Executive Order 13224", 31 December 2001, <<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2001/index.cfm?docid=6531>> [2 February 2002]

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⁷ Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary, <<http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?interdict>> [2 February 2002]

⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC: 12 April 2001), 212.

⁹ Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, "Inside the Ring", Washington Times, 4 January 2002.

¹⁰ Alfred T. Mahan, quoted in Karl A Rader, Blockades and Cyberblocks: In search of Doctrinal Purity (Washington, DC: DTIC 1995), 10.

¹¹ Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 2001), 105.

¹² Department of the Navy, Naval Warfare, Naval Doctrine Publication 1 (Washington, DC: 28 March 1994), 20.

¹³ Milan N. Vego, Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas (London: Frank Cass 1999), 202.

¹⁴ ADM. Dennis Blair, USCINCPAC, "Asian Terrorism", interview by Bob Edwards, Morning Edition, National Public Radio, 7 January 2002. <<http://search.npr.org/cf/cmn/cmnpd01fm.cfm?PrgDate=1%2F7%2F2002&PrgID=3>> [2 February 2002]

¹⁵ Bruce Stubbs and Scott Truver, America's Coast Guard (Washington, DC: January 2000), 47.

¹⁶ Peter Chalk, "Low Intensity Conflict in Southeast Asia: Piracy, Drug Trafficking and Political Terrorism", Conflict Studies, no. 305/306 (January/February 1998), 20-24.

¹⁷ John B. Hattendorf, Naval History and Maritime Strategy (Malabar, FL: Krieger 2000), 263.

¹⁸ Blair.

¹⁹ Karl A Rader, Blockades and Cyberblocks: In search of Doctrinal Purity (Washington, DC: DTIC 1995), 7.

²⁰ Julian S. Corbett, quoted in John B. Hattendorf, Naval History and Maritime Strategy (Malabar, FL: Krieger 2000), 84.

²¹ Pillar, 119.

²² Blair.

²³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3 (Washington, DC: 10 September 2001), VI-2.

²⁴ Department of the Navy, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M (Norfolk, VA: October 1995), 3-4.

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²⁶ Pillar, 100-110.

²⁷ Department of State, "Fighting Terrorism on Many Fronts", 7 November 2001, <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/rls/index.cfm?docid=5968>> [2 February 2002]

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